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When agencies such as the US Environmenta  Protection Agency (EPA) estab ish future greenhouse gas emissions
standards for new vehic es, forecasting future vehic e purchases due to changes in fue  economy and prices
provides insight into regu atory impacts. We compare predictions from a nested  ogit mode  independent y
deve oped for US EPA to a simp e mode  where past market share predicts future market share using data from
mode  years 2008, 2010, and 2016. The simp e mode  outperforms the nested  ogit mode  for a   goodness-of-
prediction measures for both prediction years. Inc uding changes in vehic e price and fue  economy increases
bias in forecasted market shares. This bias suggests price increases are corre ated with unobserved increases in
vehic e qua ity, changes in preferences, or brand-specifc changes in market size but not cost pass-through. For
2010, past shares predict better than a nested  ogit mode  despite a major shock, the economic disruption caused
by the Great Recession. Observed share changes during this turbu ent period may ofer upper bounds for po icy
changes in other contexts: the  argest observed change in market share across the two horizons is 6.6% for
manufacturers in 2016 and 3.4% for an individua  vehic e in 2010.
1. Intr ducti n
Forecasting how vehic e purchases change in response to changes in
fue  economy and prices wou d provide insights into regu atory impacts
of vehic e greenhouse gas and fue  economy standards put forth by the
United States Environmenta  Protection Agency (US EPA) and
Department of Transportation (DOT). For high-qua ity regu atory ana-
 ysis, agencies seek re iab e and rep icab e forecasts. A “commitment to
transparency and parsimony” in po icy mode ing improves mode 
credibi ity and c arity over what mode s can and cannot do (Sa te  i and
Funtowicz, 2014). The US EPA commissioned a mode  of consumer
vehic e choice from independent researchers. The mode  they deve -
oped, a nested  ogit mode , uses data avai ab e to the agencies and is
intended to ofer “a good compromise between fexibi ity and simp i-
city” (Greene and Liu, 2012).
We ask, is the independent y deve oped mode  of consumer vehic e 
choice better at forecasting than an even simp er mode  – one of per-
sistent market shares? We compare prediction accuracy using severa 
goodness of ft measures for two horizons, two years and eight years,
and eva uate whether our resu ts are driven by the nested  ogit mode 's 
sensitivity to parameter va ues. Our work joins a new research agenda 
focused on cross-va idation and mode  sensitivity, in contrast to ex-
p aining existing variation in the new vehic e feet and simu ating
counter-factua  scenarios. In transportation po icy, recent work has
emphasized mode  sensitivity (Xie and Lin, 2017; Sakti et a ., 2017) and
the process of mode  deve opment (Ciufo and Fontaras, 2017). Ma-
chine  earning's emphasis on cross-va idation and assessing the qua ity
of mode  predictions out of samp e is spi  ing over to traditiona 
econometric too s (Athey, 2017).
Our nested  ogit mode  fts within a  ong  ineage of mode s designed
to a  ow consumer substitution across diferent vehic e types. These
mode s typica  y describe a static equi ibrium; ear y work  amented that
“the treatment of dynamics is not entire y satisfying” (Go dberg, 1995). 
As an a ternative, we ofer the simp est dynamic mode  possib e: market
shares are persistent and future shares are a function of past shares and
an error term. Our simp e mode  is motivated by recent work high-
 ighting the empirica  signifcance of persistent market shares in o i-
gopo y settings (Sutton, 2007; Bronnenberg et a ., 2009).
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We use data avai ab e to the US EPA, annua  vehic e sa es data, 
manufacturer suggested retai  prices, and fue  economy, to forecast 
mode  market share. We use data from 2008, 2010, and 2016. This time 
period maximizes the  ike ihood of a change in consumer vehic e pur-
chases and comp ements work predicting vehic e sa es in a period of 
economic expansion (Haaf et a ., 2014). Economic disruption from the 
Great Recession reduced consumer spending (Mian et a ., 2013), in-
creased unemp oyment (Mian and Suf, 2014), and caused particu ar y 
severe credit constraints for Genera  Motors and Chrys er (Benme ech 
et a ., 2017). A so during this time, EPA and the Department of 
Transportation (DOT) announced future GHG and fue  economy stan-
dards for  ight-duty vehic es, though they were not efective unti  mode  
year 2012. Inc uding 2016 a  ows us to test a  onger horizon that in-
c udes the economic recovery from the Great Recession. For both 2010 
and 2016, we use changes in vehic e price and fue  economy from 2008 
to predict market shares in a nested  ogit mode . Because the mode  is 
deve oped for regu atory ana ysis, the mode  focuses on the variab es 
expected to be afected by standards; we do not incorporate changes in 
other vehic e characteristics, nor do we observe retai  prices.1 We 
compare prediction accuracy for the two mode s using goodness-of-
prediction measures inc uding the Ku  back-Leib er (KL) divergence, 
mean squared error and average share error. 
We fnd that, despite major economic and regu atory shocks, the 
simp e mode  forecast of persistent mode  market shares outperforms 
the nested  ogit for a   goodness of prediction measures for both 
horizons. Our resu t comp ements Haaf et a . (2014), who compare 
predicted sa es for 9,000 mu tinomia   ogit mode s and fnd that a 
simp e forecasting mode   ike ours has the  east forecast error in the 
short run. We difer from Haaf et a . (2014) in severa  key ways. First, 
we compare predictions for a mode  exp icit y and independent y 
designed for forecasting by US EPA that uses expert e icitation for nest 
e asticities and a more comp ex nesting structure. The mode  was 
designed specifca  y to  ook at the efects of changing vehic e price 
and fue  economy, the two variab es expected to be afected by reg-
u atory changes.2 Second, we ofer a theoretica  justifcation for the 
use of a simp e mode  of persistent market shares by  inking them to 
dynamic mode s of o igopo ies. Third, we test mode  predictions 
during the Great Recession, a period of signifcant economic con-
traction. In contrast, Haaf et a . (2014) make short run predictions in a 
period of moderate economic expansion, using data from 2004 to 
2006 to predict sa es in 2007.3 
Together with Haaf et a . (2014), our resu ts suggest a simp e mode  
is robust to macroeconomic conditions. Whi e the success of the simp e 
mode  might not surprise critics of integrated assessment mode s used 
in c imate change (Pindyck, 2013) or forecasts of oi  spot prices (A quist 
and Ki ian, 2010), it is surprising in the context of the automotive 
sector, where economists have been concerned about strategic pricing 
and cost pass-through. Persistent market shares suggest that changes in 
feet mix through strategic pricing are an un ike y comp iance path to 
1 Manufacturers se   vehic es to dea ers at an invoice price. The manufac-
turer's suggested retai  price is higher than the average rea ized retai  price due 
to manufacturer rebates, trade-in va ue, fnancing costs, and dea er incentives 
(e.g. reduced markups). A buquerque and Bronnenberg (2012) simu ate 
changes in manufacturer and dea er pricing in response to the Great Recession 
and expect that they wou d behave simi ar y: dea er prices wou d decrease by 
13 percent and manufacturer prices wou d decrease by 11 percent.
2 In its regu atory ana ysis, EPA (2010, p. 47) ca cu ated vehic e costs based 
on ho ding other vehic e attributes constant. For instance, changing from a 6-
cy inder to a 4-cy inder engine improves fue  economy but reduces power; the 
cost estimates inc uded the costs of adding a turbocharger to keep power at 
previous  eve s.
3 Haaf et a . (2014) a so predict vehic e sa es in 2010, after the Great Re-
cession, but they do so using data from 2004 to 2006, data from a period of 
economic expansion. In contrast, we use data from the Great Recession to 
predict sa es in 2010. 
achieve GHG standards.4 
In our nested  ogit mode , forecasting error arises because increases 
in manufacturer suggested retai  price appear corre ated with un-
observed increases in a vehic e's re ative qua ity – a resu t consistent 
with automakers fai ing to pass through techno ogy costs, a pattern 
observed in Europe in a retrospective study (Reynert, 2014). Across the 
two horizons, the  argest observed changes in market share were an 
increase of 3.4% at the vehic e  eve  and a decrease of 6.6% at the 
manufacturer  eve . Given the magnitude of the macroeconomic shocks, 
these changes serve as upper bounds for structura  mode  po icy si-
mu ations in other contexts. Our resu ts suggest that mode  va idation 
may be critica  when predicting consumer vehic e purchases. Further, 
regard ess of macroeconomic conditions, it appears that a simp e mode  
of fxed market shares may be suitab e for predicting the future feet in 
the short to medium run. 
2. Predicting vehicle market share 
Rosen (1974) imagined product diferentiation as a two-stage 
game, where frms choose product characteristics and product mix in 
the frst stage and price in the second stage. Recent y, scho ars have 
mode ed automaker decision-making in the medium-run, a  owing 
automakers to choose price and vehic e characteristics simu ta-
neous y, b urring the frst and second stages (Knitte , 2011; K ier and 
Linn, 2012; Whitefoot and Sker os, 2012; Whitefoot et a ., 2017). We 
focus on the short to medium run, which we defne as a period when 
the feet of mode s is re ative y fxed. In this horizon, automakers can 
make minor design changes to existing mode s but do not have enough 
time to introduce new mode s or do signifcant redesigns in response 
to the shock. We use the simp est mode  possib e for endogenous 
product design and compare it with a c assic static price-setting mode  
designed to examine sa es impacts of changes in fue  economy and 
vehic e price. 
2.1. A  imple dynamic model of vehicle market  hare  
Our simp e mode  assumes the market is in equi ibrium and that 
automakers p ay a dynamic game. If the market environment is sta-
tionary without entry or exit or shocks, optima  market share wi   be the 
same in every period. Given shocks, static mode s overestimate price 
e asticity and underestimate frm markups compared to dynamic 
mode s (Chen et a ., 2008). We justify our simp e mode  of persistent 
market shares by pointing to empirica  evidence on the persistence of 
frm and brand market share in the short run (Sutton, 2007) and across 
space (Bronnenberg et a ., 2009). 
Market share persistence may be exp ained, in part, by brand  oy-
a ty, particu ar y when a brand ofers a sing e mode  within a c ass of 
vehic es (e.g. Ford Focus, Ford's on y Compact car in 2008 and 2010). 
Brand  oya ty creates barriers to entry and gives frst movers a durab e 
advantage (Bronnenberg et a ., 2012). For autos, Anderson et a . (2015) 
show evidence that brand  oya ty is transmitted from parents to chi -
dren. Mannering et a . (1991) document brand  oya ty in new cars and 
Mannering et a . (2002) fnd the same pattern in auto  eases. Brand 
 oya ty creates a tension between the current period and a stream of 
future discounted profts: frms may be wi  ing to trade  ower markups 
today for a stream of higher markups in the future, making them  ess 
 ike y to pass through techno ogy costs or pursue a sa es-mixing com-
p iance strategy. 
Market share persistence may a so be exp ained by endogenous 
product design if automakers comp y with fue  economy standards by 
changing minor vehic e characteristics in a segment. Because peop e 
were satisfed with their previous vehic es, keeping the vehic e 
4 Greene et a . (2005) fnd that fue  economy increases are most y due to 
adoption of fue -saving techno ogies rather than shifts in sa es. 
apparent y constant might keep them in the same market.5 If changes in 
unobserved desirab e product attributes targeted to buyers in that 
market are accompanied by an increase in price, this cou d exp ain 
persistent market shares as we   as weaker prediction qua ity in a de-
mand mode . This strategy wou d substantia  y reduce comp iance costs 
from fue  economy regu ation. Evidence suggests that automakers are 
changing attributes, though it is  ess c ear whether they are unobserved. 
Knitte  (2011) argues that, given annua  techno ogica  advancement, 
increasing fue  economy may be more a matter of not continuing to 
increase weight and acce eration. Whitefoot and Sker os (2012) mode  
automakers choosing footprint, acce eration, and other fue -economy 
re ated techno ogy as they set prices; they estimate that automakers wi   
comp y with US EPA fue  economy standards in part by increasing 
vehic e footprint. K ier and Linn (2012) mode  frms choosing power 
and weight (but not engine design), as we   as prices, in their “medium-
run” horizon. As compared to a price-on y response, they fnd that 
endogenous product design decreases the cost of comp iance. Reynaert 
(2014) estimates a mixed  ogit mode  for automakers facing Europe's 
greenhouse gas emissions standards and conc udes that the dominant 
response was to use techno ogy to decrease emissions, as opposed to 
strategic price-setting to infuence sa es-mix; Greene et a . (2005) found 
a simi ar resu t using a ca ibrated nested  ogit mode . Train and Winston 
(2007) consider the  ong run and conc ude that changes in vehic e 
characteristics such as size, power, operating cost, transmission type, 
re iabi ity, and body type, exp ain decreases in domestic market share 
in the US auto market. 
Fina  y, persistent market shares may be driven by behaviora  re-
sponses by either consumers or dea ers. Dea ers order their stock of 
vehic es at the beginning of the mode  year and may base their order on 
vehic es so d the previous year, intensifying any under ying persistence 
in vehic e market shares. Dea ers may then use pricing and fnancing 
incentives to se   their inventory, which is simi ar the previous year, 
even when consumer preferences change. For their part, consumers 
may be most interested in vehic e characteristics that are persistent 
across mode  years, meaning that decreases in price or increases in fue  
economy may be  ess sa ient than fxed characteristics. 
2.2. A  tatic price- etting model of di crete con umer choice 
The forecasting mode  deve oped for US EPA mode s vehic es as 
diferentiated products so d by mu tiproduct o igopo ists in a one-shot 
Bertrand competition. Simi ar to other vehic e choice papers, the mode  
assumes vehic e characteristics (other than fue  economy and price) are 
fxed in the short run and focuses on the second stage, price-setting. 
Heterogeneity in consumer preferences is represented in a nested  ogit 
(NL), simi ar to Go dberg (1995). The main a ternatives to NL are mixed 
 ogit (e.g. Berry et a ., 1995) and a  inear system of equations (e.g. 
Austin and Dinan, 2005).6 Each approach estimates a demand system, 
which connects prices from po icy change scenarios to predicted 
changes in vehic e sa es. For NL, the mode er embodies heterogeneity in 
consumer preferences through the nesting structure instead of esti-
mated random coefcients, as in the mixed  ogit case. Go dberg used a 
5 Work in this area tends to use a mixed  ogit framework to capture consumer 
heterogeneity. Their main cha  enge is to credib y represent unknown consumer 
and manufacturer tradeofs between fue  economy techno ogy and other vehic e 
characteristics (acce eration, weight, footprint, etc.).
6 An a ternative to discrete choice mode s is to use a system of  inear equa-
tions, own- and cross-price supp y and demand e asticities by vehic e, to predict 
sa es in response to an increase in price. For examp e, Austin and Dinan (2005) 
use proprietary demand e asticities from Genera  Motors (used in K eit, 2004) 
and inferred supp y e asticities from an equi ibrium assumption, observed 
dea er markups, and an assumption on how these re ate to manufacturer 
markups. They use this system of equations to estimate how vehic e sa es mix 
changes in response to expected changes in vehic e net price as a resu t of fue  
economy standards. 
NL when estimating the impact of fue  economy standards on vehic e 
choice (1995, 1998). More recent y, Greene et a . (2005) and Harrison 
et a . (2008) used NL to eva uate the 2011–2015 CAFE standards. NL 
has a so been used to better understand demand for a ternative fue  
vehic es (Brownstone et a ., 1996) and used by other regu atory agen-
cies (Bunch et a ., 2011). 
US EPA contracted with researchers to deve op a mode  of consumer 
vehic e choice; the NL framework was justifed by Greene and Liu 
(2012) as “readi y ca ibrated with on y a sma   amount of information 
… [and it] a  ows for substantia  fexibi ity in representing substitutions 
among vehic e types.”7 Vehic e sa es are predicted to change in re-
sponse to changes in net vehic e price, which is ca cu ated as the in-
crease in vehic e cost associated with techno ogies to reduce GHGs,  ess 
a discounted share of future fue  savings associated with those tech-
no ogies.8 Demand e asticities for each vehic e nest are not estimated 
from an origina  data set, but rather are based on reviewing estimates in 
the  iterature (Greene and Liu, 2012, Tab e 4). This approach a  ows for 
synthesis of the resu ts from mu tip e ana yses, and professiona  judg-
ment about whether the va ues are appropriate. The parsimonious 
mode  design avoids adding additiona  uncertainty from projecting 
changes in other vehic e characteristics and consumers' margina  wi  -
ingness to pay for changes in vehic e characteristics. Estimates of con-
sumers' margina  wi  ingness to pay for vehic e attributes vary great y 
and may be sensitive to mode  formu ation and estimation (Greene 
et a ., 2018). 
The mode  is designed for static, same-year ana ysis of the efects on 
vehic e sa es of adding fue -saving techno ogies and their costs; that is, 
it is intended to compare vehic e sa es with and without fue -saving 
techno ogies and additiona  costs for a sing e feet of vehic es. In 
princip e, then, changes in the economy, demographics, or the feet 
over time shou d not afect the abi ity of the mode  to predict, because it 
is predicting against a same-period static counter-factua . Over time, 
changing conditions might  ead to changes in consumer responsiveness. 
Though a forecasting mode  that inc udes macroeconomic and de-
mographic information, as we   as other changes in vehic e character-
istics, might appear to be more suitab e for projecting the impacts of 
standards in the future, such a mode 's efectiveness depends on the 
qua ity of the forecasts for those additiona  factors, and how they in-
teract with other mode  parameters. 
3. Data and instituti nal c ntext 
The nested  ogit mode  was designed to use data assemb ed by EPA 
and DOT for their ana ysis of GHG and fue  economy standards for MYs 
2017-25 (U.S. EPA and DOT, 2012). We test goodness-of-prediction 
using annua  vehic e sa es and price data for mode  years (MY) 2008, 
2010 (EPA and DOT, 2012), and 2016 (U.S. EPA, 2018). Price is the 
manufacturer's suggested retai  price (MSRP).9 Each mode  year 
7 Mixed  ogit ofers a more fexib e representation of consumer heterogeneity. 
Since Berry et a . (1995), it has been used in vehic e choice mode ing (e.g. 
Petrin, 2002; Jacobsen, 2013) but mode  predictions may be sensitive to start 
va ues and the optimization routine (Knitte  and Metaxa og ou, 2014). When 
prices are corre ated with unobserved vehic e characteristics, demand mode s 
require instruments to consistent y estimate preference and cost parameters.
8 Greene (2010) found high y varied estimates in the  iterature of consumer 
wi  ingness to pay (WTP) for additiona  fue  economy in the vehic e purchase 
decision, with a number of studies showing WTP  ess than the expected va ue of 
future fue  savings, and some others showing overva uation. The mode  a  ows a 
user to choose the number of years of expected fue  savings that vehic e buyers 
are be ieved to consider in their purchase decisions, as we   as the future fue  
prices and discount rate they might use for those ca cu ations. 
9 MSRP difers from the transacted price – it fai s to refect cash incentives to 
customers or dea ers, which are  arger for  ess fue  efcient vehic es and vary 
with gas prices (Langer and Mi  er, 2013). Proprietary datasets with transaction 
prices for a samp e of transactions exist (e.g. Autodata So utions, the dataset 
Table 1 
Summary statistics for observed changes in feet. 
2008 2010 2016 
Observed Aggregated (2010) Aggregated (2016) Observed Aggregated Observed Aggregated 
Number unique vehic es 
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Weighted avg fue  economy 






















Maximum fue  economy 65.8 65.8 65.8 70.8 70.8 218.1 70.1 
Table 2 
Vehic e c ass defnition and e asticities in the consumer vehic e choice mode . 
Mode  C ass E asticity Parent Nest EPA F eet 
Prestige Two-Seaters 
Prestige Subcompact Cars 










Prestige Midsize Cars and Station −3.6* Prestige Car Car 
Wagons 









Compact Cars and Sma   Station Wagons 


















Sma   SUVs −4.9 Standard SUV Truck 
Midsize SUVs −5.1 Standard SUV Truck 
Large SUVs −5.1 Standard SUV Truck 
Minivans −4.9 Minivan Truck 
Cargo/Large Passenger Vans −5.1 Cargo Van Truck 
Sma   Pickup Trucks 







U tra Prestige Vehic es −3.9 U tra Prestige Truck 
Notes: *Parameter va ues difer for 2016 predictions due to nest e asticity re-
quirement. Prestige Subcompact Cars e asticity was −4.1 and Prestige Midsize 
Cars was −3.6. These were the c osest va ues to the origina  set that were 
feasib e. 
(1) Prestige and non-prestige c asses are defned by vehic e price: the prestige 
are vehic es whose prices are higher than or equa  to unweighted average price 
in the corresponding EPA c ass, and vice versa for non-prestige vehic es, e.g., 
Prestige Two-Seater c ass is the set of re ative y expensive vehic e confgura-
tions in EPA c ass of two seaters with prices higher than or equa  to the un-
weighted average price of EPA two seaters. 
(2) Non-prestige SUVs are divided into sma  , midsize and  arge SUVs by ve-
hic e's footprint (sma  : footprint < 43; midsize: 43 ≤ footprint < 46;  arge: 
footprint ≥ 46). 
(3) U tra Prestige c ass is defned as the set of vehic es whose prices are higher 
than or equa  to $75,000. 
contains over a thousand unique vehic es at the trim  eve . For examp e, 
there are 20 diferent versions of the Chevro et Si verado in the 2008 
data, each unique based on engine, footprint, fue  economy, and other 
attributes. We aggregate trims using the sa es-weighted average vehic e 
price and fue  economy for each vehic e.10 Tota  sa es fa   by about 20% 
(footnote continued) 
used in Langer and Mi  er, 2013 or the proprietary data used in Busse et a ., 
2013). Other researchers use MSRP (e.g., Austin and Dinan, 2005; Bento et a ., 
2009), in part for its accessibi ity. In part for accessibi ity and in part because it 
is prospective (rea ized retai  prices are on y found in retrospect), the EPA 
mode  uses MSRP. 2016 prices are defated to 2008 do  ars. 
10 This is simi ar in magnitude to Reynaert (2014), who has about 400 mode -
engine variants per market and captures 80% of the tota  samp e, dropping 
vehic es with sma   market shares. 
Table 3 
Defau t e asticities, nests 1-3. 
Leve  Name E asticity Parent Category 
Choice Among 19 Vehic e C asses within Vehic e Type 
3 Two-Seater −1.3 
3 Prestige Car −2.2 
Passenger 
Passenger 




















U tra Prestige 
Choice of Vehic e Type within Passenger or Cargo Categories 




U tra Prestige 
−0.7 Buy 
Buy 
Choice of Passenger, Cargo or U tra Prestige Vehic e 
1 Buy −0.7 
1 No Buy 
Root 
Root 
during the recession. We focus on vehic e market share, not the  eve  of 
vehic es so d. 
To predict market share in 2010, each MY 2008 vehic e needed to 
be matched with its MY 2010 counterpart. This matching is not 
straightforward.11 Vehic es enter and exit the market between any two 
mode  years; for examp e, Saab dropped out of the market entire y 
during this time and Genera  Motors dropped 21 mode s between 2008 
and 2010. After aggregation, we match 524 vehic es that capture 94% 
of the MY 2008 vehic es so d, and 91% of MY 2010 vehic es so d. 
Dropped mode  market share is about 13% of tota  sa es in each year. 
To predict sa es in 2016, we aggregated data to the manufacturer-
c ass  eve . Match qua ity was simi ar to that in 2010. Tab e 1 compares 
the disaggregated feet to the aggregated feet. Prices and fue  economy 
do not difer great y. In tota , 108 vehic es remained unmatched be-
cause they were manufactured in one year but not in the other; these 
are dropped in the 2010 ana yses.12 Changes in avai ab e mode s be-
tween two years are fair y common in the auto industry, and are among 
the cha  enges associated with predicting changes in vehic e purchases. 
Annua  vehic e- eve  variation in the percentage change in price and 
11 In some cases, vehic es change c assifcation across the years, e.g. from 
Subcompact to Subcompact Prestige. In these cases, we use the 2008 EPA 
c assifcations/nests for predictions and observed 2010 vehic e sa es outcomes.
12 As a robustness check, we aggregate trims to each to manufacturer-c ass for 
2010 as we  . In this specifcation, for examp e, we predict future market shares 
for Nissan compact cars to be the same as current market shares for the suite of 
compact cars ofered by Nissan. This approach a  ows us to inc ude mode s that 
were unmatched across years. However, we are sti   ob igated to drop manu-
facturers not observed in both periods (e.g. Saab). Our resu t – that the simp e 
mode  predicts better than the nested  ogit – is robust to this aggregation 
strategy. Resu ts avai ab e upon request. 
=P j k P j k P k( ) ( | ) ( )
=P P Pjk j k k|
fue  economy for 2010 and 2016 is shown in Fig. 1. The distribution for 
price is near y symmetric about zero, whereas the distribution for fue  
economy is skewed toward increases in fue  economy. Together, these 
fgures fai  to suggest that changes in price are determined by increased 
costs from fue  economy techno ogy. On average, fue  economy in-
creased by 3% in 2010, in keeping with the trend for fue  economy in 
the mid-2000s in the U.S. market (US EPA, 2016).13 
Our mode  eva uation compares sa es in 2010 to sa es in 2008, a 
window of time punctuated by macroeconomic shocks and trends. 
Housing prices fe  , decreasing househo d wea th; in response, con-
sumer spending dropped (Mian et a ., 2013). Reduced consumer de-
mand caused an increase in unemp oyment (Mian and Suf, 2014). 
Meanwhi e, auto credit markets contracted, with the most severe de-
creases in  ow income markets (Amronin and McGranahan, 2015) and 
for  easing companies re ated to Genera  Motors and Chrys er 
(Benme ech et a ., 2017). Gas prices were very high in ear y to mid-
2008, exceeding $4 per ga  on. Consumers responded by purchasing 
more fue  efcient vehic es in 2008 (Busse et a ., 2013). Lower gas 
prices in 2010 reduced returns to fue  economy. In 2009 the US gov-
ernment  ent Chrys er and GM more than 20 bi  ion do  ars to enab e 
them to make payments to workers and creditors. The bai out may have 
reduced enthusiasm for GM and Chrys er vehic es from American 
consumers in 2010. Few economists were optimistic that either com-
pany wou d withstand the Great Recession (Goo sbee and Krueger, 
2015). Changes between 2010 and 2016 were  ess dramatic, char-
acterized instead by a steady economic recovery. 
Two vehic e po icy changes occurred between 2008 and 2010: the 
federa  Cash for C unkers program and the announcement of new  ight 
duty vehic e standards by EPA and DOT. The Cash for C unkers program 
increased vehic e purchases in 2009 in part by pu  ing forward about 
300,000 vehic es that wou d have been purchased in 2010 (Mian and 
Suf, 2012; Li et a ., 2013).14 In 2009, the US EPA and DOT announced 
 ight-duty vehic e GHG and fue  economy standards for mode  years 
2012–16, fna ized in ear y 2010.15 Though the standards wou d not go 
into efect unti  mode  year 2012, it is possib e that automakers started 
to change vehic e characteristics in preparation for comp iance with the 
standard, acce erating the dep oyment of techno ogy re ated to fue  
16economy. 
4. Meth ds 
Like some others mode ing consumer vehic e choice (e.g. Sen et a ., 
2017; Haaf et a ., 2014; Xie and Lin, 2017), we focus on market shares, 
rather than vehic e sa es. In our case, market shares mitigate changes in 
tota  sa es from the Great Recession. We examine whether the simp e 
mode  or the static mode  performed better in predicting changes in the 
composition of the feet, as measured by market share, in the face of the 
Great Recession's signifcant market shock. 
13 Note that the re ationship between improvement in fue  economy and re-
duced fue  consumption is non- inear. See Larrick and So   (2008). 
14 To be e igib e for the Cash for C unkers program, a new car needed to have 
a price be ow $45,000 and get at  east 22 MPG. For SUVs, medium-duty pas-
senger vehic es, pickup trucks, minivans and cargo vans, the MPG requirement 
was 18 MPG. For vans with a whee base that exceeded 124 inches or  arge 
pickup trucks with a whee base that exceeded 115 inches, the requirement was 
at  east 15 MPG. Very  arge vans and trucks (Category 3) had no MPG minimum 
but were required to be made no  ater than MY2001. 
15 These standards were in part a response to the Energy Independence and 
Security Act of 2007, which required a feet average fue  economy of at  east 35 
mi es per ga  on (mpg) by 2020. The new standards use a footprint-based 
system, which re ates a manufacturer's emissions and fue  economy ob igations 
to the vehic e footprint, defned as the area between the whee base and track 
and measured in square feet.
16 Reynaert (2014) found that automakers updated vehic e techno ogy in 
anticipation of EU GHG standards, reaching comp iance before the dead ine. 
Consider a discrete choice representative consumer framework 
where uti ity is derived from unobserved vehic e characteristics Ajk and 
vehic e cost Gj. To simp ify notation, we describe the mode  for two 
 eve s of nests. For vehic e j in c ass k, vehic e cost is a combination of 
price Cjk and a share of the present discounted va ue of savings Fjk from 
fue  economy.17 
= + + = + +U A B G A B C F( )jk jk k j jk jk k jk jk jk (1) 
If the error term is distributed extreme va ue, the choice probabi ity 
for a ternative j is , which is equa  to its market share.18 The 
conditiona  probabi ity of choosing a ternative j given that an a ter-
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where Broot is the genera ized cost coefcient for vehic e c asses. 
4.1. Simple model foreca t: per i tent market  hare  
A simp e econometric mode  of vehic e market shares inspired by 
Sutton (2007) predicts that o igopo ists' vehic e market shares are 
persistent across time. Forma  y, this corresponds to the coefcient 
equa  to zero in equation (1). Vehic e shares are sti   a function of the 
inferred vehic e constant term Ajk, though the constant is not ca cu-
 ated. In the simp e mode , forecasted shares are equa  to past shares: 
Bk
=+E P P[ ]j t j t, 1 , (4) 
As in the nested  ogit mode , our unit of ana ysis is annua  market 
share for a mode  made by a manufacturer for 2010 and manufacturer-
nest for 2016. Data are at the annua   eve  to refect the types of data 
avai ab e to US EPA. Assuming persistence at a fne  eve   ike the ve-
hic e is in keeping with recent evidence that consumers shift between 
vehic es with the same footprint in response to gas shocks (Leard et a ., 
2017).19 
4.2. Ne ted logit model 
Greene and Liu (2012) deve oped a vehic e choice mode  for EPA 
intended to estimate changes in tota  sa es and feet mix in response to 
GHG and fue  economy standards. Given a vehic e feet, the mode  a -
 ows regu ators to compare vehic e sa es and fue  economy with and 
without fue  economy standards.20 The nested  ogit mode  (NL) fore-
casts vehic e market share using observed shares, fue  economy, and 
17 Great debate exists about the ro e of fue  savings in consumer vehic e 
purchases (Greene, 2010; Greene et a ., 2018). Some researchers fnd that ve-
hic e buyers consider the expected fu    ifetime of fue  savings in deciding on 
how much fue  economy to buy (e.g., Busse et a ., 2013), whi e others argue 
that buyers put much  ess emphasis on fue  economy (Ga  agher and 
Mueh egger, 2011).
18 Forma  y, the probabi ity is . 
19 As noted above, as a robustness check, we aggregated the data to the 
manufacturer-c ass  eve . Resu ts avai ab e upon request.
20 EPA regu ates GHG emissions from vehic es; the Department of 
Transportation regu ates vehic e fue  economy. Because the primary way to 
reduce GHG emissions is to improve fue  economy, the agencies have  arge y 
harmonized their regu ations (U.S. EPA and DOT, 2010, 2012). The mode  uses 
fue  economy rather than GHG emissions, because fue  economy is more sa ient 
an attribute to vehic e buyers and direct y afects expenditures. 
=A S S i kln ln ,ik ik k1
price in 2008 and changes in fue  economy and price in 2010. The NL 
does not estimate price e asticities in ca cu ating the cost coefcients 
Bk. Instead, the cost coefcients are approximated using e asticities 
from the  iterature: 
=B
p S¯ (1 ¯ )k
k
k k (5) 
where, for vehic es in c ass 
S̄k
k, k is the own-price e asticity, p̄k is average 
price, and is average conditiona  market share for vehic es in c ass k. 
This expression is derived from the defnition of e asticities and  ogit 
mode  equations (Train, 2009). Tab es 2 and 3 provides the e asticities 
used in the ana ysis, which, as discussed above, are the synthesis of 
estimates from mu tip e sources (Greene and Liu, 2012). The nested 
 ogit restricts demand e asticities for the nests: responsiveness to price 
must be highest at the individua -vehic e  eve , and decrease at each 
higher nest. 
Given nest cost coefcients, each vehic e's constant term is ca i-
brated to ft base ine sa es data. For any two vehic es within a c ass, the 
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(7) 
One vehic e's constant is norma ized to zero, giving 
, where Sln k1 is the share of the norma -
ized constant. Observed shares and cost coefcients from prices and 
fue  economy in 2008 pin down vehic e and c ass- eve  constants. The 
constant for not buying a vehic e is assumed to be zero. 
As mentioned above, Greene (2010) found high y varied estimates 
in the  iterature of consumer wi  ingness to pay (WTP) for additiona  
fue  economy in the vehic e purchase decision. Fue  Savings for vehic e j 
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where r is the consumer discount rate, L is the payback period in years 
(that is, the number of years of future fue  savings a buyer considers in 
the purchase decision re ative to up-front costs), FP ( ) is the price of 
fue  in year, is the OnRoad discount factor that discounts fue  
economy 
M ( 1)
in order to refect rea -wor d driving conditions,
1
21 and 
are the annua  mi es trave ed for a vehic e of age . 
The defau t payback period is assumed to be fve years, consistent 
with “the  ength of a typica  new  ight-duty vehic e  oan” (U.S. EPA and 
DOT, 2010, p. 25517). Future fue  savings use a defau t discount rate of 
3%.22 Future fue  prices are reported in 2008 do  ars. Year 1 fue  prices 
are that year's rea ized fue  prices and come from US Energy Informa-
tion Administration's (EIA) Annua  Energy Out ook (2012). Projected 
fue  prices come from EIA's Annua  Energy Out ook Petro eum Product 
Prices (2008, 2010).23 In Fig. A-I in the appendix, we see that in 2008 
ana ysts expected both gaso ine and fue  prices to decrease over a 
twenty-year period. In 2010, however, ana ysts expected gaso ine prices 
to increase over the next twenty years. Annua  mi es trave ed difer for 
cars and trucks and decrease over time; see the second pane  of Fig. A-I. 
These va ues are used by EPA in estimating the efects of MY 2012-16 
21 “ʻOnRoad Discount’ is used in fue  cost ca cu ation to discounts EPA fue  
economy (MPG) test va ue, which is disp ayed in fue  economy window stickers 
and used in the [mode ], to better refect fue  economy under rea -wor d driving 
conditions” (Greene and Liu, 2012, p. 39). 
22 In the technica  appendix, we investigate the sensitivity of mode  predic-
tions to variation in the e asticities, payback period, and discount rate. 
23 Motor gaso ine prices are ca cu ated based on “ … sa es weighted-average 
price for a   grades. Inc udes Federa , State, and  oca  taxes” and “Diese  fue  for 
on-road use. Inc udes Federa  and State taxes whi e exc uding county and  oca  
taxes.” 
vehic e fue  economy/GHG standards on vehic es (US EPA and DOT, 
2010).24 
4.2.1. Ne ting framework 
The fve-nest structure, shown in Fig. 2, was independent y deve -
oped by Greene and Liu for US EPA (2012). The structure is simi ar to 
Bunch et a . (2011) and NERA (2009). The frst  ayer constitutes the 
buy/don't buy decision. Next it distinguishes between passenger ve-
hic es, cargo vehic es, and u tra-prestige vehic es.25 The mode  then 
separates passenger vehic es into Two Seaters, Prestige Cars, Standard 
Cars, Prestige SUVs, Standard SUVs, and Minivans, and cargo vehic es 
into Pickup Trucks and Vans. The next  eve  – the  ast nest - continues 
the division into c asses. At this nest, the mode  uses a simp e  ogit 
mode . Within this nest are the individua  vehic es for 2010 and the 
weighted averages for manufacturers in 2016. Within nests,  ogit ex-
hibits “independence of irre evant attributes:” the ratio of probabi ities 
(or market shares, in this mode ) of two options does not vary if a third 
option is added to the mix. As a resu t, an increase in the market share 
of one a ternative within a nest draws proportionate y from a   other 
a ternatives (Train, 2009). Across nests, independence of irre evant 
attributes does not ho d. 
Vehic es are c assifed into nests by type, size, and re ative price. 
Vehic es with prices higher than or equa  to unweighted average price 
in the corresponding EPA c ass are c assifed as Prestige vehic e-
s.26U tra-Prestige vehic es have prices that exceed $75,000. Non-pres-
tige SUVs are divided into sma  , midsize and  arge SUVs by vehic e 
footprint.27 
4.2.2. Ne ted logit foreca t  
The NL uses data from 2008 to estimate the cost coefcient Bk, 
determined from its own-price e asticity k from the 
S̄k
 iterature and 
average price p̄k and average conditiona  market share within c ass k 
according to expression (5). Given cost coefcients Bk, the mode  ca i-
brates vehic e- eve  constants Ajk to ft shares in 2008. To forecast 
shares, the mode  uses these cost coefcients and vehic e- eve  con-
stants as we   as the 2010 vehic e cost Gj in expressions (2) and (3) to 
ca cu ate the choice probabi ity for a ternative j, =P P Pjk j k k| . 2010 ve-
hic e cost Gj is determined by the vehic e's 2010 price and fue  
economy. 
4.3. Mea uring goodne  -of-prediction 
We use severa  measures to compare goodness-of-prediction across 
the simp e and nested mu tinomia   ogit mode s. The frst is Ku  back-
Leib er (KL) divergence, which measures the gap between an observed 
distribution and a predicted distribution (Ku  back and Leib er, 1951). 
Maximum  ike ihood estimation attempts to minimize the KL diver-
gence, defned as 
24 Since the payback period is fve years, on y initia  diferences in rea ized 
and projected gas prices and mi es trave ed change the vehic e's net price.
25 In the mode , sport-uti ity vehic es and minivans are inc uded as passenger 
vehic es, a though many of these vehic es are considered  ight-duty trucks for 
regu atory purposes. Consumers common y consider these to be passenger ve-
hic es; it is more  ike y, for instance, that peop e consider an SUV to be a 
substitute for a  arge or midsize car than for a pickup truck. Because the mode  
is meant to refect consumer decision processes, it was considered appropriate 
to nest SUVs and minivans as passenger vehic es rather than cargo vehic es. 
26 For examp e, the Prestige Two-Seater c ass is the set of re ative y expensive 
vehic e confgurations in EPA's c ass of Two-Seaters, those with prices higher 
than or equa  to the unweighted average price of EPA Two-Seaters. 
27 Sma   SUVs have a footprint  ess than 43 square feet, Midsize SUVs have a 
footprint between 43 square feet and 46 square feet, and Large SUVs have a 
footprint greater than or equa  to 46 square feet. 
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where Pi is the observed market share and Qi is the predicted market 
share. Next, we use two re ated goodness-of-prediction measures, mean 
squared error and average share error: 
mean squared error
N









Like Haaf et a . (2014), we p ot a cumu ative distribution function 
(CDF) of abso ute error, P Q| |i i , to compare mode  performance at 
diferent error thresho ds. The CDF of error shows the percentage of 
mode  predictions that have error  ess than a given thresho d. To 
measure the NL's accuracy in predicting growth or dec ine in market 
share, we create a binary variab e equa  to one if the direction of the NL 
prediction matches the observed change in vehic e market share and 
assess the fraction of predictions correct y reported. 
5. Results 
Tab e 4 reports our goodness-of-prediction measures across the two 
mode s. For a   measures except Direction, a  ow va ue indicates  ess 
mode  error; for both years, for a   error measures, the simp e mode  
outperforms the Nested Logit (NL). Ku  back-Leib er Divergence mea-
sures the diference between a predicted distribution and the true dis-
tribution. It must be positive and wou d be zero if the mode  perfect y 
predicted the observed distribution. Tab e 4 shows that the simp e 
mode  has a  ower Ku  back-Leib er divergence as compared to the NL. 
Mean squared error shows a simi ar pattern: the mean squared error for 
the simp e mode  is near y ha f that of the NL mode . Mean squared 
error uses a quadratic  oss function, which pena izes out iers. Average 
share error for the simp e mode  is about two-thirds that of the NL. The 
NL correct y predicted the direction of market share change about two-
thirds of the time. It appears that the simp e mode 's error distribution is 
 ess biased and its average error is  ower than the NL.28 
Next, we turn to the graph of the cumu ative distribution of errors 
for both mode s for 2010 in Fig. 3. The cumu ative error function re-
ports the share of predictions that fa   within a certain error to erance. 
For examp e, 85–90% of the mode s' predictions are within an error 
to erance of 0.002. A higher va ue for a given error to erance imp ies 
that the mode  has a greater share of tota  predictions with an error  ess 
than the to erance. The simp e mode  has a higher share of predictions 
within the to erance for a   error to erances. For very  ow to erances, 
such as those be ow 0.0005, the diference between the two mode s is 
sma  . 
The better forecasting performance of our simp e mode  is in  ine 
with other papers that test out-of-samp e predictions of vehic e choice, 
particu ar y those that compare estimates to a simp e mode  of static 
market shares. Haaf et a . (2016) use data from MY 2004-6 vehic es to 
estimate a number of diferent econometric mode s and test their pre-
dictions against MY 2007 and 2010 vehic e sa es. They fnd that a 
simp e mode   ike ours – that is, one that assumes constant market 
shares – performs we   compared to other mode s for one year forecasts 
of MY 2007. Haaf et a . (2014) a so fnd that a simp e mode  outper-
forms mu tinomia , mixed, and nested  ogit mode s, even when varying 
the functiona  form of the uti ity function and the set of attributes used 
for the prediction. Like Haaf et a . (2016), we fnd that a sma  er cost 
coefcient – zero, in our case – improves our predictions. Inc uding 
changes in price biases estimates in the wrong direction. Price increases 
corre ated with increases in unobserved vehic e qua ity, changes in 
28 These resu ts ho d even when we aggregate vehic es to the manufacturer-
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preferences, or brand-specifc changes in market size may exp ain this 
fnding, due to their expected opposite efects on the price coefcient. 
For the short run, these resu ts suggest that persistence of market 
shares is a strong predictor of future market shares. For a horizon of at 
 east 4 years, Haaf et a . (2014) fnd that inc uding vehic e attributes 
improves prediction accuracy over the simp e mode . They cite entry by 
new vehic es as the reason for the simp e mode 's poor prediction ac-
curacy over a  onger horizon. A mode  inc uding vehic e attributes, 
however, requires forecasts of those attributes in the future, which in-
creases uncertainty. Uncertainty grows non- inear y when these fore-
casted parameters interact, potentia  y making the mode   ess usefu  for 
po icy (Sa te  i and Funtowicz, 2014). We fnd that the simp e mode  
continues to outperform the nested  ogit in 2016. 
5.1. Relation hip between change  in price and market  hare 
To get a better sense of the re ationship between changes in price 
and market share, Fig. 4 shows patterns for the six  argest manu-
facturers in 2010. The x-axis is the percentage change in price (MSRP) 
in 2010, re ative to 2008. The y-axis is the percentage change in market 
share in 2010, re ative to 2008.29 To make the graphs easier to read, the 
percentage changes are top-coded at 200% for the share increase and 
40% for the price increase. The NL mode  has a cost coefcient term 
that is negative and approximated using e asticities reported in the 
 iterature. If there is a negative re ationship between price and share, 
the scatter p ots shou d be downward s oping from  eft to right. Honda 
comes c osest to exhibiting this re ationship; the other automakers fai  
to show such a pattern. For examp e, for Toyota the re ationship be-
tween price and market share appears to be positive. This wou d be 
consistent with prices accompanying improved vehic e qua ity or an 
increase in demand.30 
Bk
For the remaining automakers, the re ationship is unc ear. Chrys er 
and Genera  Motors shares appear shifted downward, consistent with a 
brand-specifc shock such as  imited non-bank fnancing for these two 
companies (Benme ech et a ., 2017). Ford may have benefted from 
these restrictions, with severa  vehic es experiencing  arge increases in 
market share and price in the upper right quadrant. Toyota, Honda, and 
Nissan had a sma   set of vehic es that experienced increases in market 
share. For Toyota, the Camry, Prius, and Coro  a saw increased sa es in 
2010 re ative to 2008. Margina  buyers who abstained from purchasing 
during the Great Recession may have been those that preferred 
29 For examp e, if a vehic e had a market share of 0.5% in 2008 and 0.4% in 
2010, the re ative change wou d be 20%.
30 We use the 2008 MSRP and the change in MSRP instead of transacted price, 
which inc udes cash incentives for dea ers and customers. Using MSRP wi   bias 
the nested  ogit predictions if automakers chose MSRP and cash incentives 
joint y, instead of using cash incentives for unanticipated responses to fuc-
tuations in demand. For examp e, if automakers increased MSRP but added cash 
incentives such that the transacted price fa  s, this cou d increase sa es (either 
direct y, from a  ower price, or indirect y, through reference dependence). We 
know that automakers use cash incentives defensive y, to address regiona  de-
mand shocks or gas price shocks (Langer and Mi  er, 2013), but we are not 
aware of evidence that they are joint y determined. If they are, this may be 
another reason to use a simp er mode  when predicting vehic e market share. 
Fig. 1. 1Annua  Variation in price, fue  economy, and market share. 
Fig. 2. 2Nested  ogit structure of consumer choice mode . 
manufacturers'  ess popu ar vehic es. 
Announced standards may have  ed to product design changes to 
increase fue  economy that fai ed to pass techno ogy costs through to 
price. Fig. 1 fai s to suggest a strong re ationship between price and fue  
economy changes. Reynert (2014) shows evidence that automakers in 
Europe responded to announcements of standards enough to reach 
comp iance ear y, and they comp ied via techno ogy, not sa es-mixing. 
For the U.S., trends in fue  economy techno ogy penetration support 
this prediction: Gaso ine Direct Injection was used in  ess than 3% of 
vehic es in MY 2008 and is projected to reach ha f of the MY 2016 
mode s (US EPA, 2016). The number of car mode s with a minimum of 
30 MPG was 28 in 2008, 40 in 2010, and expected to be near y 70 in 
2016 (EPA, 2016). The pattern is simi ar for SUVs; the number of SUV 
mode s with at  east 25 MPG was 10 in 2008, 14 in 2010, and near y 50 
in 2016. The difusion of fue -saving techno ogy to riva s is good for 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions; Sutton (2007) describes a simi ar 
pattern in Japanese o igopo ies. However, difusion a so reduces returns 
to investment in innovation. 
5.2. Change  in ne t and automaker market  hare 
Fig. 5 reports observed abso ute changes in market share between 
Fig. 3. 3Cumu ative error distribution (2010 resu ts). 
2008 and 2010 and 2008 and 2016 by nest and manufacturer in order 
to ofer upper bounds for structura  mode  po icy simu ations. We focus 
on the changes in 2010 here; patterns are most y simi ar for 2016. In 
2010, sa es grew s ight y more concentrated: the Herfndah -Hirschman 
Index grew from 1,271 in 2008 to 1,308 in 2010. We report resu ts for 
automakers and the  owest  eve  nests that had at  east 4% market 
share.31 We fnd that the Great Recession increased the share of Stan-
dard Cars at the expense of prestige cars, prestige SUVs, and pickups, 
among others. The Standard Car c ass market share increased by a most 
5 percentage points, main y from increased sa es for four vehic es: the 
Ford Fusion, and the Toyota Camry, Coro  a, and Prius. Coro  a sa es 
trip ed in 2010, despite fat prices and fue  economy and  ower priced 
riva s. 
In contrast, GM and Chrys er/Fiat  ost 5% and 1.5% market share. 
These decreases in market share may be driven by  ess access to non-
bank  enders associated with GM and Chrys er, who were constrained 
during the Great Recession (Benme ech et a ., 2017). They cou d a so be 
driven by brand-specifc shocks due to the auto bai out (Goo sbee and 
Krueger, 2015). The net efect was a  oss of market  eadership by GM, a 
resu t that echoes the importance of idiosyncratic, industry-specifc 
shocks as a driver of changes in market  eadership in Japanese o igo-
po ies (Sutton, 2007). Toyota and Ford market share increase by about 
4% across the two years. 
5.3. Ne ted logit model  en itivity 
One possib e reason for the superior performance of the simp e 
mode  is if the nested  ogit mode  is sensitive to parameter va ues and 
we use the wrong parameter va ues. This is a potentia  prob em with 
more comp ex mode s in po icymaking – they create more opportunities 
for uncertainty and disagreement about parameter va ues, potentia  y 
rendering them  ess credib e in the eyes of the pub ic (Sa te  i and 
Funtowicz, 2014). To investigate mode  sensitivity, we took the base 
feet in 2008 and simu ated a 20 percent increase in fue  economy to a   
vehic es and no increase in price. We then compared predicted market 
shares with our preferred parameter va ues and a 20 percent increase in 
fue  economy to: variation in the mode 's initia  feet; the expert e icited 
e asticities; the discount rate; and the payback period. Fu   resu ts from 
the sensitivity ana ysis are reported in the appendix. We found that the 
mode 's predictions were fair y insensitive to changes in parameter 
va ues and transformations of the initia  feet, making it un ike y that 
the simp e mode 's success is driven by parameter va ues. It cou d, 
however, be driven by the nesting structure, the interaction of para-
meter va ues, or data qua ity (i.e. manufacturer's suggested retai  price 
instead of rea ized retai  prices). 
6. Discussi n 
A priori, the way that auto manufacturers wi   achieve GHG/fue  
economy standards is ambiguous. On the one hand, the automakers can 
add fue -saving techno ogies, which are  ike y to increase prices if au-
tomakers pass through costs.32 Another possibi ity is that standards 
may induce strategic pricing, where frms achieve comp iance by 
shifting the mix of vehic es so d through prices –a strategy known as 
“sa es-mixing” (e.g., Go dberg, 1998; Jacobsen, 2013).33 
We can reconsider the choice between adding techno ogy and using 
price in the context of a dynamic o igopo y mode  where the equi i-
brium is persistent market shares. If consumers form habits, sa es today 
afect future sa es. When choosing a vehic e, changes in price or fue  
economy may be  ess sa ient to consumers than persistent, unobserved 
vehic e characteristics. Instead of passing through techno ogy costs, 
frms may choose  ower markups today in order to avoid  osing sa es 
both today and in the future. Likewise, though a sa es-mixing strategy 
might reduce the cost of comp iance today, it may bring  arge future 
opportunity costs. If markups are higher on  ess fue  efcient vehic es, 
and consumers form habits, shifting consumers to more efcient ve-
hic es resu ts in fewer future sa es on vehic es with higher markups. 
Given tradeofs between current and future profts, automakers may 
respond to standards with increased innovation in and adoption of fue  
economy techno ogy. In this way, they cou d improve fue  economy at 
 ower cost, keeping current and future markups high. An innovation 
response wou d be in  ine with the Porter Hypothesis, which states that 
environmenta  regu ations may “trigger innovation that may partia  y 
or more than fu  y ofset the costs of comp ying with them” (Porter and 
Van der Linde, 1995, 98, cited in Ambec et a ., 2013). An innovation 
response may be more  ike y in o igopo y settings, where market  eaders 
may prefer to “coast” and neg ect investment in research and deve -
opment un ess their market  eader positions becomes threatened 
(Ericson and Pakes, 1995). For industries in Japan, Sutton (2007) 
documents persistent market share and, for some industries, shares 
remain stab e because successfu  innovations are quick y imitated by 
riva s. 
For vehic es, there is evidence of an innovation response. K ier and 
Linn (2016) show an increased rate of adoption of fue -saving tech-
no ogy in response to fue  economy standards. Reynaert (2014) found 
that frms used a techno ogy response to comp y with European GHG 
standards. In this case, fue  economy standards wou d increase in-
novation,  owering the costs of achieving the standards. 
7. C nclusi n and p licy implicati ns 
Within the Great Recession, we assessed the re ative forecasting 
performance of a nested  ogit mode  and a simp e mode  of persistent 
market shares. The nested  ogit mode  was deve oped for predicting the 
future vehic e feet given fue  economy standards and techno ogy costs. 
The simp e mode  was motivated by empirica  evidence of persistence 
in o igopo ies. Using vehic e sa es in 2008, 2010, and 2016, we com-
pared each mode 's goodness-of-prediction using three error measures. 
32 For instance, improving the fue  economy of a minivan from 18 mi es per 
ga  on (mpg) to 22 mpg, as occurred with the Honda Odyssey between 2010 
and 2014, is expected to save $400/year, according to fue economy.gov. The 
2014 mode  is  isted as about $2000 - $4000 more expensive than the ear ier 
version; it has changed in characteristics other than fue  economy during that 
time. 
33 In the medium to  ong run, they may change vehic e characteristics such as 
1) improved techno ogy (K ier and Linn, 2012) or changes in vehic e size 
(Whitefoot and Sker os, 2012; Whitefoot et a ., 2017) or 2) changing the ve-
hic es they ofer in their feet (introducing more efcient mode s or retiring 
mode s that fai  the standards). 31 The fu   set of c asses and manufacturers are used in the feet- eve  resu ts. 
Fig. 4. 4Price and market share change (2010 Resu ts). 
Fig. 5. 5Percentage Point Change in Share for Nests and Automakers. Note: Automakers restricted to those with at  east 4% market share. 
For each measure, for each horizon, we found that the simp e mode 's performance from the simp e mode  is consistent with other vehic e 
forecasts were  ess biased than those from the nested  ogit mode . mode ing comparisons (Haaf et a . 2014, 2016) and in other contexts 
Comparing the simp e mode  to the nested  ogit framework, we (e.g. hea thcare, Bayati et a ., 2018, or oi  spot prices, A quist and 
 earn that inc uding information on vehic e price and fue  economy Ki ian, 2010). Given these resu ts, more research is needed to va idate 
increased prediction bias. Sensitivity ana yses of the nested  ogit mode , vehic e choice mode s before they can be re iab y used in a regu atory 
reported in the appendix, make it un ike y that this resu t is driven by context. Researchers mode ing consumer vehic e choice shou d consider 
parameter va ues. Though it is possib e the nested  ogit's poor perfor- further va idation as part of their research. In the meantime, using past 
mance cou d be driven by mode  design, e.g. nest structure or combi- market shares may be a good approximation for vehic e markets. 
nation of parameter va ues, or the discrepancy between manufacturer's During the Great Recession, automakers fai ed to pass a ong costs 
suggested retai  price and rea ized retai  prices, better prediction associated with improved fue  economy. Between 2008 and 2010, 
automakers increased fue  economy by 3% but prices remained about 
the same. Between 2008 and 2016, fue  economy increased by 20% and 
prices changed by 5.5%. Changes in vehic e price appear uncorre ated 
with changes in fue  economy. However, given prediction bias in the 
nested  ogit mode , price changes appear corre ated with changes in 
unobserved vehic e qua ity, changes in consumer preferences, or brand-
specifc changes in market size. We fai  to fnd evidence of automakers 
anticipating comp iance via sa es mixing. Instead, automakers may 
comp y with greenhouse gas emissions standards through product de-
sign by adding fue -saving techno ogies, consistent with the Porter 
Hypothesis (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995). A techno ogy response is 
consistent with the European experience (Reynert, 2014), with US 
regu atory agencies' mode s (US EPA and DOT, 2010, 2012), and with 
recent work eva uating the product design response to US and European 
standards since 2003 (K ier and Linn, 2016). Automaker techno ogy 
adoption appears to maintain market share, consistent with predictions 
in o igopo y settings (Sutton, 2006). 
Appendix A. Supplementary data 
Supp ementary data to this artic e can be found on ine at https:// 
doi.org/10.1016/j.enpo .2019.02.051. 
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